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using those that are available the internal validity is usually 
problematic (e.g., there is no random assignment to experi-
mental and control groups).
4.  They can question how the topic of interest has been addressed 
so far. Some researchers raise the question whether the problem 
of systematic error is due to the predominance of particular 
methods in research and to the lack of an adequate anthro-
pological  concept.  In  this  interpretation,  the  bias  problem 
reflects a restricted methodology. This approach is appropriate 
insofar it addresses the bias problem in its full consequence. 
Most of the researchers defending it, however, conclude that a 
completely different methodology is necessary (e.g., Guba and 
Lincoln, 2000); any other methodological approach, however, 
is just as much in need to address potential biases since it may 
be vulnerable to systematic errors although these might be dif-
ferent compared with the ones of the criticized methods.
5.  A fifth way to react is proposed here: to develop theories that 
(1) account for the biases and that (2) can (and need to) be 
put in relation with the theory under investigation in a parti-
cular study. It is assumed that this way is the most appropriate 
because systematic errors are taken seriously and the respec-
tive threats – as far as they are known – are accounted for in 
the support and critique of a statement.
It is proposed that taking into account situations and the con-
cept of action is a good base for this. The theory to be proposed 
in this paper, the Theory of Situation Specificity (TSS), addresses 
all these issues.
People often behave differently in different social situations, as 
has been mentioned repeatedly in the scientific literature, both in 
the older literature in which the topic was explicitly addressed (see 
the reviews by Mischel, 1968; Mischel and Peake, 1982; Patry, 1991a; 
etc.) as well as in newer studies (Ginsburg et al., 2006, to mention 
IntroductIon
Research in social science is plagued by plenty of problems, some of 
the most important ones being methods biases. In its most liberal 
sense, a bias refers to systematic error in a research study (Gerhard, 
2008); in the terms of Sackett (1979, p. 60) it is “(a)ny process at 
any stage of inference which tends to produce results that differ 
systematically from the truth.” Since systematic errors are not obvi-
ous, theories for plausible rival hypotheses (Campbell, 1969) are 
necessary that provide explanations for the results of a study that 
differ from the one proposed by the hypothesis that is supposed 
to be tested.
According to Bungard and Bay (1982) researchers can react in 
four different ways to the risks of biases:
1.  They can ignore biases; although this is the most frequent way, 
it is certainly the least appropriate one because the problem is 
not dealt with at all.
2.  They can try to control for or even eliminate the potentially 
disturbing factors. A minority of methodically aware resear-
chers follow this path. This is a possibility that has two disad-
vantages: (a) A systematic account of the potentially disturbing 
factors is necessary; this requires a theory that accounts for 
these factors, but such a theory is usually not used, mostly it is 
not even available. (b) The ecological validity (external validity 
with respect to situations outside of a research context) is in 
jeopardy because in “real life” the inhibiting factors that are 
eliminated or controlled for research purposes have a different 
impact than in the research study (limits of laboratory rese-
arch, cf. Patry, 1982).
3.  They can use alternative methods like the unobtrusive mea-
sures (Webb et al., 2000); this is done by even less researchers. 
This approach has clear limits: For many research questions 
one cannot find occasions for such assessments, and in studies Frontiers in Psychology  |  Quantitative Psychology and Measurement    February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 18  |  2
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remain unchallenged, and there were several attempts to “solve the 
consistency problem,” i.e., to develop methods which would yield 
higher correlations (e.g., Bem and Allen, 1974; Magnusson and 
Endler, 1977; Epstein, 1980; Buss and Craik, 1983; Snyder and Ickes, 
1984; and many more; cf. also West, 1983; Kenrick and Funder, 
1988; etc.); however, despite these authors’ claims to have done so, 
the problem was not solved.
In most of these attempts, situational effects were considered as 
“error” (Mischel and Peake, 1983) or “noise” (Shoda, 2007, p. 327). 
Such an interpretation might be appropriate for some goals but 
not for others:
Depending on one’s purpose, the within-person variance – the 
interactional effects of persons with the conditions of their lives – 
may be as much part of the “true” fabric of human behavior, to be 
understood and analyzed, as is the abstracted categorization of a 
person’s average performance in relation to a comparison group on 
the summary score of a more or less arbitrarily created test battery. 
(Mischel and Peake, 1983, p. 395)
I do not want to go into the debate that ensued (see Hoefert, 
1982a;  Schmitt,  1990;  Moser,  1991;  Patry,  1991a;  Krahé,  1992; 
and others for details) but just mention that it has lost its vigor, 
and despite relevance as argued above, situation specificity is not 
an important topic in today’s personality and social psychology 
research anymore, as can be seen in the abstracts of the 11th Annual 
Meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology (SPSP, 
2010), Among the 77 symposia and over 2000 posters, only few 
papers and posters deal more or less directly with situational issues 
and address the consistency debate as such (Cervone and Caldwell, 
2010; Griffo and Colvin, 2010; Hensler and Wood, 2010; Sherman 
et al., 2010; Witt and Donnellan, 2010; this is a slight increase com-
pared to the 2009 conference), some more deal with situational 
issues more or less directly or mention the impact of situations 
or situational factors without providing any deeper analysis of the 
situation dependency of behavior.
The result of the research on situation specificity can be sum-
marized as follows (Patry, 2000):
1.  In the social domain, i.e., when social behavior is at stake, 
situation specificity is the rule. For this there are exceptions 
under  well-defined  conditions  (see  for  instance  Price  and 
Bouffard,  1974;  Price  and  Blashfield,  1975).  In  the  social 
domain, assessments using systematic observation by exter-
nal observers have almost always yielded situation specifi-
city; using questionnaires (e.g., personality questionnaires) 
however often does not show situation specificity unless the 
questionnaire is specifically conceived to be able to identify 
variation due to situations (e.g., in the tradition started with 
Endler et al., 1962).
2.  In  the  cognitive  domain,  that  is  when  cognitive  abilities, 
intelligence,  achievement,  knowledge,  and  the  like  are 
at  stake,  cross-situational  consistency  is  the  rule,  provi-
ded that in the two situations of interest the same ability 
is asked for. However, consistency seems to be lower than 
usually assumed; one can mention the problems in transfer 
(Salomon and Perkins, 1989; Detterman, 1993) or the pro-
blems of situated cognition (Brown et al., 1989; Cognition 
but one) although usually not in terms of situation specificity; and 
in many studies it is emphasized that situation specificity needs to 
be accounted for (among the many let me cite just Heppner et al., 
2006; Radford, 2006; Sullivan-Marx, 2006).
Situation specificity, hence, seems to be a very important issue in 
psychology, in particular in social psychology, not to mention per-
sonality psychology where the discussion has started (e.g., Mischel, 
1968; see below, Situation Specificity). Nevertheless, mostly situa-
tion specificity is just noticed within the study and not theoretically 
accounted for and not addressed as an important issue in current 
social research.
That situation specificity may have an immense influence on 
quantitative research methods has rarely been discussed, and even 
less accounted for theoretically, as would be necessary accord-
ing to the fifth mode of dealing with biases. The aim of this 
paper is to address some of the relevant issues in methodology 
arising from situation specificity with particular emphasis on 
assessment. I will first give a brief introduction to the topic of 
situation specificity and present relevant elements of our TSS. In 
the subsequent sections central issues of reliability and validity 
are addressed and the TSS is applied. In the final section meta-
theoretical, theoretical, methodological, and practical conclu-
sions are presented.
SItuatIon SpecIfIcIty
the problem
In 1968, Walter Mischel published his book “personality and assess-
ment,” which triggered a broad debate. Mischel showed that in social 
behavior (particularly when assessed with systematic observation 
instead of questionnaires, cf. Peake, 1982), the correlations between 
assessments of behavior in different situations rarely exceed 0.30, 
while in cognitive psychology, consistency across situation is usu-
ally much higher. Looking back, Mischel (2004) comments the 
book as follows:
Beginning with Hartshorne and May’s (1928) studies of consci-
entiousness in schoolchildren, research had been driven by the 
assumption that the invariance of personality would be reflected 
in the stable rank-ordering of individuals in their behavior on 
any given dimension (e.g., conscientiousness, sociability, depend-
ency), assessed with the cross-situational consistency coefficient. 
The assumption was rooted in a conceptualization of individual 
differences in social behaviors as direct reflections of behavioral 
dispositions, or traits. Dispositions and their behavioral expres-
sions were assumed by definition to correspond directly, so that 
the more a person has a trait of conscientiousness, for example, the 
more conscientious the person’s behavior was expected to be over 
many different kinds of situations, relative to other people. Given 
that assumption, the persistent findings that the individual’s behavior 
and rank order position on virtually any psychological dimension tends 
to vary considerably across diverse situations, typically yielding low 
correlations, distressed the field and changed its agenda for years. 
(Mischel, 2004, p. 2; italics added)
Mischel was not the only researcher to notice this persistent 
finding: Much earlier (Heiss, 1948) and about at the same time 
(Bellows, 1963; Vernon, 1964; Hunt, 1965; Peterson, 1968; Wiggins, 
1973; etc.) similar statements were published. But Mischel (1968) 
was undeniably the most influential publication. His results did not www.frontiersin.org  February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 18  |  3
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  provided, for instance, by Bellows (1963), Eckes (1990), Frederiksen 
(1972), Hoefert (1982b), Kelley et al. (2003), and Price (1974), 
or concepts like the episodes (Barker and Wright, 1971), though 
inspiring, may be very questionable because of possible differences 
between the theory underlying the chosen taxonomy and the theory 
to be tested.
For the present purpose, I use Pervin’s (1978) definition:
A situation is defined by who is involved, including the possibility 
that the individual is alone, where the action is taking place, and the 
nature of the action or activities occurring. The situation is defined 
by the organization of these various components so that it takes on 
a gestalt quality, and if one of the components changes we consider 
the situation to have changed. (pp. 79f)
The components at stake in a particular study, then, will depend 
on the theory in such a way that circularity is avoided. Because of 
space restrictions, it will not be possible to elaborate in detail what 
this means in the specific studies or contexts that are discussed, 
although this could be done.
In TSS, it is assumed that situations have an impact on a sub-
ject’s behavior only insofar as it is perceived by him or her, and 
with respect to the features (components in the terms of Pervin) 
that are perceived. Which of the situative features are relevant is 
determined by the subject’s subjective theory, as far it is activated in 
the situation; hence it is the subject who determines which features 
are important and which are not.
Situation specificity means that relevant features of the behav-
iors of the same person1 are different in different situations. This 
means that not the behavior as a whole is observed, but only 
certain characteristics thereof. For instance someone can behave 
cross-situationally  consistently  with  respect  to  one  behavioral 
feature (e.g., eye contact; or intelligent behavior) but situation 
specifically with respect to another (e.g., loudness of speaking; 
introverted behavior).
The opposite of situation specificity is cross-situational consist-
ency. The higher the consistency (the lower situation specificity), 
the better one can predict the behavior feature(s) in situation S2 
given that one knows the one(s) in situation S1. Three types of situ-
ation specificity can be distinguished (Table 1; from Patry, 2000, 
p. 16, with additions):
•	 Relative situation specificity: The rank orders of the subjects 
with respect to the interesting feature(s) of the behavior(s) are 
similar in both situations. This can be estimated using cor-
relation coefficients: The lower the correlation, the lower the 
consistency, i.e., the higher the situation specificity. It is neces-
sary to have at least two assessments of the same subjects in 
both situations. To establish a rank order it is necessary to have 
several subjects. It is not necessary to assess the same features 
in both situations; for instance, responding to a questionnaire 
(B1 in S1) can be correlated with observations of the behavior 
(B2 in S2), provided it is assumed that the features addressed 
by B1 and B2 belong to the same theoretical construct (e.g., a 
and Technology Group at Vanderbilt, 1990; cf. also Lave, 
1988; Greeno and the Middle School Mathematics Through 
Applications  Project  Group,  1998),  and  inert  knowledge 
(Whitehead, 1967; Renkl, 1996): The subjects have learned 
the content but do not apply it in new situations although 
this would be appropriate.
3.  One can distinguish roughly two types of research questions 
(Mischel and Peake, 1983): Question 1 deals with interper-
sonal  variance,  and  situational  variance  is  interpreted  as 
measurement  error  (“measurement  noise  that  obscure(s) 
a clear view of the person,” Shoda, 2007, p. 327). This is the 
case for instance in differential psychology and in many stu-
dies in educational psychology. This is an important research 
approach, and it is not the aim of this paper to question its 
relevance, therefore the approach defended here cannot be 
called “situationist” (see also Mischel’s, 2004, argumentation 
in this regard). However, it is also possible to address question 
2 about how to account for intrapersonal variance, i.e., trying 
to account for the measurement error of question 1. This is 
what is done here.
4.  For this it would be necessary to have a theory of situation spe-
cificity. However, only rudimental concepts of such a theory 
have been provided in the scientific literature so far. Among 
the most promising approaches one can mention:
•	 person–situation	interaction	in	the	tradition	of	Magnusson 
and Endler (1977), which among others has been applied to 
personality (Endler, 1983) and anxiety (Endler, 1997);
•	 the	theory	of	intentional	action	(Ajzen, 1987);
•	 Brunswick’s	lens	model	(Asendorpf, 1992);
•	 Lewin’s	field	theory	(1951)	and	further	developments	the-
reof (e.g., Herber and Vásárhelyi, 2002);
•	 Mischel’s (1968, 1973) theory of social learning, of which 
the TSS is a further development.
5.  All these theories have in common that situation specificity 
in the sense of an adaptation of the subject to the given con-
ditions is appropriate in most situations. Someone is called 
“socially competent,” for instance, if he or she has appro-
priate goals in a given situation, knows how to achieve them 
and  acts  accordingly.  The  goal  structure  and  the  means 
to  achieve  the  goals,  however,  will  vary  from  situation 
to situation.
defInItIonS of “SItuatIon” and “SItuatIon SpecIfIcIty”
The definition of “situation” is much more complicated than usu-
ally assumed. The main problem is that a definition of situations 
used in a particular study must not be circular within the research 
design of that study (Thonhauser, 2007); a definition is circular if 
the situation is defined as conditions that yield behavioral differ-
ences, and then behavioral differences are “accounted for” by the 
situation. Such a circular definition must be avoided through an 
appropriate theory building and design (Patry, 2007). In addition, 
the definition of a situation must be in accordance with the hypoth-
esis that is being tested in this study, which in turn will depend 
on the specific theory that is under investigation; hence taxono-
mies of situations for which universal applicability is claimed, as 
1 In special cases, different groups of people in different situations can be com-
pared provided the groups can be assumed to be equal (usually through random 
  assignment).Frontiers in Psychology  |  Quantitative Psychology and Measurement    February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 18  |  4
Patry  Situation specificity and biases in assessments
the theory of SItuatIon SpecIfIcIty
Based on Mischel (1968, chapters 6 and 72) the TSS was devel-
oped and tested since the 1980s (details see Patry, 1989a, 1991a, 
1992, 2000, etc.); those elements that are necessary for the further 
argumentation are described below. Since experience shows that 
misunderstandings are quite frequent in the discussions on situ-
ation specificity, the attempt is made to formulate as precisely as 
possible, at the risk of being overly detailed. The examples are taken 
from methodical issues and deal with the researchers’ behaviors 
(in Reliability and Validity and following, the focus will be on the 
subjects’ behavior).
Following Mischel (1968, chapter 6), his social learning recon-
ceptualization of personality (1973), and its further development 
Cognitive Affective Personality System (CAPS, Mischel and Shoda, 
1995; Mischel, 2007), the subject’s goals and the means to achieve them 
are at the center of the theory. This is also in agreement with issue 5 
in the review of the research on situation specificity presented above 
in Section “The Problem,” as well as with Bungard and Bay’s (1982) 
fourth and my own (fifth) answer to the bias problem (referring to 
actions) presented in the introduction. Accordingly, the central ques-
tion is whether the means are appropriate to achieve the goals.
The basic assumption of TSS is that people tend to behave opti-
mally with respect to achieving the respective goals, unless there 
are theoretically justified factors inhibiting this tendency. This opti-
mization is done according to the subjective theory of the subject 
in the sense of Groeben et al. (1988). This means that behavior is 
assumed to be a rational action. Among these inhibiting factors 
one can mention emotions and arousal (as, for instance, in the 
Yerkes–Dodson-relationship).
People have often (but not always) several goals simultaneously 
(within one situation); the states of affairs being described by them 
can be incompatible (Rotter, 1954; Patry, 1997a, 2005a; Patry and 
Schrattbauer, 2000; etc.). This is particularly the case in social situ-
ations. Although one can assume that people have more than two 
questionnaire on introversion, B1, and an observation of intro-
version, B2). The scale level of the assessed features must be at 
least ordinal (requirement for correlations).
•	 Absolute situation specificity: The absolute values (or means) 
of the feature under investigation are different between situa-
tions. This can be tested using comparison of means [t-test 
with  dependent  samples,  analysis  of  variance  (ANOVA) 
with  repeated  measures]  or  differences  in  pairs  of  values 
(Wilcoxon); in case of nominal features tests like Chi-square 
can be used. It is possible to randomly assign the subjects 
to two groups (one for each situation) and to compare the 
means  (t-test  with  independent  samples, ANOVA  between 
subjects;  Mann–Whitney).  Significant  differences  (or  more 
appropriately,  high  effect  sizes)  represent  situation  specifi-
city. It is possible to assess situation specificity for one sin-
gle person, provided sufficient estimates of the behavior are 
available (e.g., time series with several observations in situa-
tion S1 and several observations in S2). The requirement for 
absolute consistency assessments is that the same feature is 
measured in both situations (or that the features can be tran-
sformed to be on the same scale, e.g., through appropriate z 
transformations).
•	 Coherence: Magnusson and Endler 1977), Endler et al. (1962) 
conceived  the  Person–Situation  Interaction  in  terms  of 
ANOVA: The higher the variance accounted for by the per-
son × situation interaction, the higher the situation specificity. 
For this type of analysis the requirements are highest: The 
same subjects must be assessed with the same instrument in 
several situations, and the data must be on the interval level.
Comparing behavior in similar situations is an assessment of 
stability; this must not be confounded with cross-situational con-
sistency. Mischel (1968) and many other studies do not question 
stability (relative consistency). Since stability is equivalent with 
retest reliability, or more generally with reliability according to 
any reliability estimates (see below, The Problem), and since reli-
ability is not questioned in the literature, the problem of situation 
specificity as posited by Mischel (1968) and in the consistency 
debate (see above) cannot be reduced to a reliability problem, as 
has been done, for instance, by Epstein (1979, 1980); this has been 
underlined by Mischel and Peake (1982, 1983) and others. Rather, 
situation specificity is a substantial issue that requires a theoretical 
account for its own.
Table 1 | Types of consistency (with additions from Patry, 2000, p.16; translated from German).
  Relative consistency or  Absolute consistency or situation specificity  Coherence 
  situation specificity
Definition  Rank order of subjects similar  Absolute value of (groups of) people equal  Reliable behavior patterns
Key figure  Correlation or the like  t-Test, ANOVA, ARIMA, etc.; possibly χ2  ANOVA, Interaction P × S
Indicator of  Small correlation (absolute value;   Significant differences (high effect size)  High variance accounted for 
situation specificity  low effect size)    P × S
Subjects  Same  Same or similar (through random assignment)  Same
Number of subjects  Several  One or more  Several
Assessment tool  Similar or different  Similar  Same
Required scale level  At least ordinal  Nominal possible  Usually interval
2 These two chapters of “Personality and assessment” are rarely referred to in the 
literature on situation specificity. Even Mischel himself seems to have forgotten his 
own concepts: The theory he developed later on, for instance the statement “in-
dividuals are characterized by stable, distinctive, and highly meaningful patterns 
of variability in their actions, thoughts, and feelings across different types of si-
tuations. These if . . . then . . . situation–behavior relationships provide a kind of 
‘behavioral signature of personality’ that identifies the individual and maps on to 
the impressions formed by observers about what they are like” (Mischel, 2004, p. 8) 
and other elements are less elaborate than the issues discussed in these two chapters 
of his 1968 book (Patry, 2009a).www.frontiersin.org  February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 18  |  5
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city”). Given the assumption that people tend to behave optimally, 
a relationship of the type “not too much and not too little” will 
yield full situation specificity (when different goals are at stake) 
and phenotypic situation specificity (with similar goals).
There are situations in which the subjects aim at performing 
their best possible performance. Then the principle “the more, the 
better” applies; the performance is limited by the subjects’ ability. 
Complete consistency will then be the case if the following condi-
tions are satisfied (cf. Sackett et al., 1988):
a.  In each situation, all goals within the situation are compatible 
(no conflicting goals).
b.  In both situations, the respective goals are to do the best.
c.  In both situations, the “best” depends on the same ability.
An example is Datta’s (1963) study on scientists’ creativity. The 
correlation between the subjects’ creativity test results (S1) and 
the on-the-job ratings of creativity (S2) was rho = 0.71 (relative 
consistency) provided that the subjects knew in S1 that creativity 
was at stake. This means: In both situations the goals were the 
same, namely creative achievement, which addresses the same abil-
ity, and the subjects tried to do their best. In contrast, when the 
subjects were not told in S1 that creativity was at stake (different 
goals in S1 and S2), the correlation was much lower (rho = 0.17). 
One can stipulate that the goal in S1 was not to do the best with 
respect to creativity, actually the goal(s) the subjects pursued is or 
are not known; hence b and/or c in the above list were not satisfied. 
Subsequent research confirmed and differentiated this finding (see 
O’Hara and Sternberg, 2001; Chen et al., 2005).
These are the elements of the TSS that are important for the 
present purpose. More details and additional features of this theory 
are provided elsewhere.
Most of the theory’s lawlike statements have been confirmed in 
many studies, many of which were not performed to test situation 
specificity hypotheses; quite the opposite: The typical published 
studies in this domain hypothesized that the behavior is consistent 
across situations, and this hypothesis was usually refuted unless 
both measures were with questionnaires (Patry, 1991a).
The TSS is a theoretical framework that can be used to inte-
grate other theories. The TSS, by itself, is not sufficient because 
of the risk of a circular definition of situations. One relationship 
for theory integration is the superordinate/subordinate status: A 
superordinate theory is more general than the subordinate one, 
while the latter concretizes some of the issues that are left open by 
the superordinate one. Mischel (2007, p. 271) claims that CAPS 
is a superordinate theory4, “a general framework that spells out 
a possible underlying structure”; it is superordinate for the TSS 
which addresses, among others, the relationship between expecta-
tions (variable 3 in CAPS; here called “means”) and goals (values 
in CAPS, variable 4) and between abilities (CAPS variable 1) and 
expectations, etc. TSS, in turn, is superordinate to other theories, 
such as the theory of self-presentation (Christensen, 1981).
incompatible goals, for sake of simplicity, the further discussion will 
deal with maximally two goals; in the case of more goals, the theory 
must be enhanced according to the same principles as discussed.
If people have different goals in different situations, one can 
speak of situation specificity of goals. Again, actually, it is necessary 
to focus on specific features of the goals; for instance, a student may 
have the general goal of finishing his or her studies in all study-
related situations (lectures, group work, test): cross-situational 
consistency of the goals; on the level of the specific goals (under-
standing a concept, communicating, performing well) he or she will 
vary in function of the situation (situation specificity of goals).
One can distinguish two types of relationships between the 
means (behavior) and the outcome value3: “The more, the better” 
(relationship a in Figure 1) and “Not too much and not too little” 
(relationship c). Since any behavior feature B has a complementary 
feature non-B (“doing B” means “not doing non-B”; “doing more 
B” means “doing less non-B”), the third type, “The less, the better” 
(b in Figure 1) for B, can be regarded as “The more, the better” for 
non-B, hence a and b in Figure 1 are not principally different and 
will therefore not be distinguished unless necessary.
Depending on the situation, the optimum of the relationships 
“Not too much and not too little” will differ (see Figure 2; Patry, 
1991a, 2009b). This holds particularly if the goals are different in 
both situations. But it holds also in most situation pairs if the goal 
is the same (or highly similar) in both situations because it is quite 
frequent that in different situations different means are appropriate 
to achieve the same goal (so-called “phenotypic situation specifi-
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FiGuRe 1 | Relationships between the behavior and its outcome value; a: 
the more, the better; b: the less, the better; c: not too much and not 
too little.
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FiGuRe 2 | “Not too much and not too little”: different optima in different 
situations; d, e, f: different optima.
3 This requires that both behavior and goal features are assessed at least on an ordi-
nal scale level; in the case of nominal scale level, as in most expected utility models, 
the analysis will be different but this cannot be done here.
4 Actually he calls it a “meta-theory,” which is not appropriate since a meta-theory 
is a theory about a theory whereas the relationship between a superordinate theory 
and a subordinate theory is between theories that both are about the same kind of 
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assessment) one lesson per week. The assessments were, among 
others, about the teacher’s control (amount of direct teaching) 
with five items on a scale from 1 through 5 (for instance, “In this 
unit the teacher has given the students much – vs. little – personal 
freedom”; one refers to much freedom, five to little freedom, i.e., 
highly direct teaching). The studies using this method (e.g., Patry, 
2000) have shown that the students answer quite homogenously 
(high interobserver agreement).
With this kind of data, the following steps are done:
1.  Content validity: The items are judged for appropriateness 
with respect to the underlying theoretical construct (in the 
present case, for “amount of directive teaching”).
2.  Internal consistencies within the situation: Since several items (in 
the case mentioned above: five items) are used in the observation 
questionnaire by several students to assess the same construct, 
Cronbach’s α can be calculated; if the items are homogeneous, 
internal consistency can become quite high compared to typical 
questionnaires (in Patry, 2000, the average of the situative inter-
nal consistencies for direct teaching was αmean = 0.73). In this 
case the mean of the items is calculated to form an average for 
each situation. These are given in Figure 3.
3.  Autocorrelations (see, for instance, McCleary et al., 1980, p. 
66ff) of the classroom averages per situation are calculated 
to check for serial dependencies. A serial dependency must 
be assumed if the autocorrelation coefficient for lag 1 (auto-
correlation from tn to tn+1) is significant. In the above asses-
sment with 1 week or more separating the assessments, no 
serial dependencies were found. Typically, even with shorter 
intervals, no such dependencies are found if the observation 
is in different situations.
4a.  If no serial dependencies are found, we perform statistical 
analyses with the presupposition of serial independence. If 
the requirements like normal distributions are met (as was 
the case in this study) repeated measures ANOVAs are calcu-
lated per class with the situations as levels of the factor; the 
significances are reported in Figure 3.
4b. If the autocorrelations are significant, the assessments, cannot 
be considered as independent in the statistical sense. Classical 
statistical methods like repeated measures ANOVAs then can-
not be used; instead methods like ARIMA (cf. McCleary and 
Hay, 1980) can be used if the conditions for this are satisfied.
methodologIcal challengeS when aSSeSSIng SItuatIon 
SpecIfIcIty
In contrast to the traditional comparison between people, assess-
ing intrapersonal variability poses a certain number of challenges. 
Some of them will be discussed here. The most important issue 
is the question of dependence of assessments since two or more 
measures with the same people are necessary.
A first type of dependence is in ability testing. Take the exam-
ple that the same intelligence test (speeding tests) is responded by 
the same subject twice, one immediately after the other. One can 
imagine that the subject has learned from the first test taking and 
therefore will be faster the second time; in Campbell and Stanley’s 
(1963) terminology this would be a pretest effect on the post-test 
that will jeopardize internal validity. Because of such effects, reliabil-
ity of tests is assessed using parallel tests, i.e., tests that are similar 
but not equal; split half and internal consistency reliabilities are 
special cases of this. If the same test is used (stability), the second 
testing is performed a certain time (typically at least a few weeks) 
after the first one so that it can be assumed that the subject has 
forgotten about the features of the test.
When observing social behavior, however, the interdependen-
cies are different. A prototype for such an assessment is Flanders 
(1970): The observation system requires coding teacher and stu-
dent behavior on 1 of 10 categories every 5 s (time sampling). The 
categories of teacher behavior include, among others, “lectur-
ing” and “asking questions,” the students’ categories are “student 
responses” and “student initiation.” In such an assessment, serial 
dependencies may occur (Dumas, 1986): It is quite likely that 
the behavior at time tn has an influence on the behavior on time 
tn+1, 5 s later. For instance, lecturing, asking questions, respond-
ing to questions or initiating a discussion usually last longer 
than 5 s, hence the conditional probability of category x at tn+1, 
given category x at tn, is higher than the unconditional prob-
ability of category x. Further, the category “student response” 
occurring at tn+1 requires the category “asking questions” at tn (or 
earlier) since it is defined as teacher initiated student statement. 
To identify such dependencies Flanders has conceived transition 
matrices, and his research show very high dependencies. The 
problem here is not remembering (which would be a test related 
variable and hence an assessment bias) but rather the behavior 
itself that has serial dependencies; this is the case independently 
of any observation.
To study situation specificity, we have used the lesson interrup-
tion method (Patry, 1997b, 2000): The teacher interrupts the lesson 
at a pre-decided time (e.g., before changing to a new topic), and 
the students answer a short questionnaire (typically we have used 
about 12 questions, but in some cases – e.g., Patry et al., 2000 – 
the questionnaire was longer) about their observations for the last 
15 min. This way those who are most concerned by the lesson – the 
students – report their observation of what, in their view, has actu-
ally been going on in the given situation (the last 15 min). Once the 
students are accustomed with this method, they will respond very 
quickly; the experience shows that this observation does not disturb 
the course of the lesson. A typical result of such an assessment is 
given in Figure 3: The same teacher in a vocational school teaches 
five separate classes (101 through 106; class 104 did not finish the 
FiGuRe 3 | Directivity of one teacher in five classes; teaching is once a 
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consistencies reported by Mischel (1968), hence, mean that in 
social behavior criterion-related validity is quite low unless there 
are similar assessment tools; this indicates a strong instrument (or 
situation) bias.
Such instrument biases can be identified in the MTMM matrix: 
An instrument bias would result in a relatively high heterotrait 
monomethod (different constructs assessed with similar methods) 
correlation compared to the monotrait heteromethod correlation 
(convergent validity). And this is actually what is found in many 
MTMM analyses: Already Campbell and Fiske’s synthetic example 
showed quite high correlations in the heterotrait monomethod 
triangles, almost the same size as the validity diagonals (convergent 
validities: monotrait heteromethod cells). In their examples taken 
from the literature (their tables 2 through 12), with few exceptions, 
the heterotrait monomethod correlations are at least as high as, 
if not higher than, the convergent validities. Indeed, they state in 
their summary:
Measures of the same trait should correlate higher with each other 
than they do with measures of different traits involving separate 
measures. Ideally, these validities should also be higher than correla-
tions among different traits measured by the same method.
Illustrations from the literature show that these desirable condi-
tions, as a set, are rarely met. Method or apparatus factors make 
very large contributions to psychological measurements. (p. 104; 
italics added)
These large contributions of method or apparatus factors have 
been found consistently in MTMM analyses of social behavior 
assessments since the introduction of the matrix by the authors 
of the MTMM technique (Campbell and O’Connell, 1967; and 
Fiske, 1982); later for instance Spector (1989) found no methods 
bias by just comparing correlations, but Williams et al. (1989), 
using confirmatory factor analysis, showed that the method bias 
was quite substantial. Many meta-analytical studies followed (e.g., 
Dickenson et al., 1986; Cote and Buckley, 1987; Marsh, 1990; Woehr 
and Arthur, 2003; Bowler and Woehr, 2006; etc.) in which consist-
ently the method variance (in terms of TSS: variance accounted for 
by the situation) was substantial unless the methods were rather 
similar (which is in accordance with Mischel’s, 1968, first conclu-
sion presented above in The Problem). Obviously, there is a problem 
with the methods.
To  address  this  question  using  the  TSS  it  is  necessary  to 
  distinguish what Cronbach (1970) has called “typical” and “maxi-
mum” performance.
typIcal and maxImum performance
For an analysis of assessment in terms of the TSS, first, it is nec-
essary to check whether the behavior-outcome relationship is 
of the type “the more, the better” or “not too much and not too 
little.” The former is related with cross-situational consistency, 
the latter with situation specificity. With respect to assessment, 
this distinction is the same as the one introduced by Cronbach 
(1970, p. 35ff). Tests to seek to measure maximum performance 
are used “when we wish to know how well the person can per-
form at his best” (p. 35), whereas typical performance refers to 
“what he is likely to do in a given situation or in a broad class of 
5.  It is also possible to use average values over situations. In this 
case it is necessary, first, to calculate the internal consistency 
with the situations as items and the means according to step 
2 as values. The principle here is: Use the reliability (internal 
consistency) of the measure that you use.
Differences between situations (step 4a) often reach a high effect 
size; with each class represented in Figure 3, for instance, an ANOVA 
with repeated measure was calculated, and the results show highly 
significant effects, i.e., there are differences between the situations, 
and high variance accounted for (η2). A teacher has once said that this 
method is like a seismograph of teaching. Interestingly, in contrast 
to these differences, the internal consistencies according to step 5 are 
usually very high. This contrast is due to the fact that the first dif-
ference (step 4a) refers to differences in the observed characteristics 
(e.g., the behavior of the teacher), while internal consistency refers 
to characteristics of the observers (in this case, the students).
relIabIlIty and valIdIty
Psychological research aims at achieving validity. Traditionally, 
a  distinction  between  the  validity  of  the  assessment  tool 
(Cronbach and Meehl, 1955; Campbell and Fiske, 1959) and 
the validity of the design (Campbell and Stanley, 1963) is made, 
and typically only one of them is discussed, isolated from the 
other. One could add to this the validity of the independent 
variable. Although issues of situation specificity are important 
for all three validities, because of space restrictions I will deal 
only with assessment.
the problem
In their famous paper Campbell and Fiske (1959) state:
Reliability is the agreement between two efforts to measure the same 
trait through maximally similar methods. Validity is represented 
in the agreement between two attempts to measure the same trait 
through maximally different methods. (p. 83)
This can be seen as operational definitions of reliability and 
validity. The classical approaches to reliability, like internal con-
sistency, split half reliability, parallel test reliability and retest 
reliability, are in full agreement with this operational defini-
tion; the same applies to approaches like interrater or intrarater 
reliabilities and the like. As to validity, Campbell and Fiske’s 
convergent validity (which are the same as concurrent validity in 
the Cronbach and Meehl terminology) is a prototypical example 
for the application of their operational definition; in the multi-
trait–multimethod (MTMM) matrix, its informational value is 
enhanced by comparing it with the discriminant validities. The 
operational definition applies to other concepts of validity of 
assessment tools as well.
“Methods” in the above definition can be seen as a synonym 
of “situation” since the assessment method is one component of 
situation according to the definition (see Definitions of “Situation” 
and “Situation Specificity”). Substituting “method” with “situation” 
does not change the meaning of Campbell and Fiske’s statements. 
Hence the definitions address directly the issues of stability (reli-
ability) and situation specificity (validity). The low cross-situational Frontiers in Psychology  |  Quantitative Psychology and Measurement    February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 18  |  8
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There have been some misunderstandings about the distinction 
between maximum and typical behavior. For instance Ackerman 
and Kanfer (2004) say that Hebb’s distinction of Intelligence A and 
Intelligence B and Cattel’s distinction of fluid intelligence (Gf) and 
crystallized intelligence (Gc) provide a reasonably close categoriza-
tion of abilities that are associated with maximal performance and 
typical performance, respectively. (p. 121) The authors argue that 
the prototypical measures of what they call typical performance, 
WAIS-III, and Stanford–Binet IV, test “knowledge that the examinee 
has acquired and maintained over a long period of time.” I agree 
that there is a difference between this type of intellect and the 
situations” (Cronbach, 1949). While Cronbach underlines that 
“(t)he classification scheme is a convenience in organizing our 
discussion, not a basis for theory” (Cronbach, 1949), I see it as 
an instance of the TSS.
A similar distinction has been provided by Fiske and Butler 
(1963); see also Willerman et al. (1976), Wallace (1966), Sackett 
et al. (1988, 2007) and others. Patry (1991a) provided distinctions 
between typical and maximum performance with respect to 28 
issues; a short version is presented in Table 2, referring to paper–
pencil  or  researcher-subject  face-to-face  assessments  like  tests, 
questionnaires, interviews, etc.
Table 2 | Differences between maximum and typical performance assessments following Fiske and Butler (1963), Cronbach (1970), Wallace (1966), 
Willerman et al. (1976) and others (excerpt from Patry, 1991a, pp. 298–303).
Feature Maximum performance Typical performance
Assessed variable Ability to respond Disposition to respond
Generalization aimed at What someone can do, but not what he or she will do What someone is likely to do; the ability to do so is 
assumed to be given
Method Usually assessed directly: The subject does, what the 
researcher is interested in
Assessed indirectly: The subject describes what he or she 
does or feels in certain situations or reacts to ambiguous 
material; sometimes observation is used
Instruction: What is assessed? “This is an ability test. ” The subject is informed about the 
ability at stake (intelligence, knowledge, creativity, etc.)
Usually the subjects are not told that it is a (personality) test 
and about the disposition at stake to avoid reactive effects
Instruction: Right answer “Give the right answer to each question!” “There is only 
one right answer”
“There is no right or wrong answer” 
Instruction: How to answer “Try to give your best!” “Be as honest as possible!”
Instruction: Number of answers “Do not expect to be able to answer all questions!” “Please answer all questions, do not leave out any!”
Dealing with missing values Missings are errors Missings lead to elimination of the subject from the sample 
(or a guess what the answer would have been)
Instruction: Clearness Instruction is not always clear, but clearness is aimed at Instruction is not always clear, but ambiguity is often 
intended, particularly in projective tests
Implicit understanding The subject assumes that the researcher wants him or 
her to do his or her best
The subject has no information about what the researcher 
aims at, he or she may guess (rightly or wrongly)
Relationship researcher-subject Researcher controls the situation; for the test to be 
possible, the subject must accept his or her role; 
researcher and subject agree in their goals: harmonic 
relationship
Researcher controls the situation; for the test to be 
possible, the subject must accept his or her role; researcher 
and subject have different goals: relationship is not 
harmonic
“Difficulty” (probability of 
answers of a certain type) 
True difficulty: There are items that the subject cannot 
answer (within the time restrictions); difficulty is 
important
All items can be answered in all ways by all subjects; 
“difficulty” plays no role 
Robustness Slightly differences in the formulation of the item and in 
context factors have no influence on difficulty
Slight differences in formulation of the items or context 
factors have an important influence on the results
“Upper limit” There is an upper limit in performance: ability There is no “upper limit”
Response strategy Usually the strategy used by the subject is the one 
assumed by the researcher
Usually the researcher has no information about the answer 
strategy used by the subject
Consequences for the subject Usually the subject knows quite well what 
consequences his or her answers will have
Usually the subject does not know how his or her answers 
will be interpreted and what consequences a specific 
answer will have (but he or she can guess)
Comparability Assessments of different subjects are comparable: The 
test assesses the same for all subjects
Assessments of different subjects may assess different 
constructs (particularly in projective tests)
Reliability Stable, high internal consistency Lower stability, lower internal consistency; reduced 
applicability of test theory
Judgment criterion The more, the better There is an optimum: not too much and not too little; the 
optimum may differ from situation to situationwww.frontiersin.org  February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 18  |  9
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not. Since school tests aim at assessing the ability, the maximum 
performance column in Table 2 can be interpreted as a checklist 
for good school tests.
In school tests there is the possibility that a student does not 
aim at performing to his or her best. One can imagine a student 
who does not want to be seen as a know-it-all by his or her peers 
or aims at a lower achievement for other reasons; in Weber and 
Cook’s (1972) terminology this would be called a (partly) negativ-
istic subject. In this case the principle “not too much and not too 
little” applies: The student shows a lower performance than would 
correspond to his or her ability, but not too low so that it does not 
become obvious that he or she does not do his or her best.
Maximum performance conditions are very rare. Besides school, 
maximum performance can be found in sports (e.g., in a 100-m 
dash, the athletes run as fast as they can: “the more, the better”) 
and, to some degree, in job situations (e.g., Sackett, 2007). It is quite 
straining to perform at one’s best in some regard over an extended 
period of time. We follow the principle “the more, the better” only 
upon request, either when asked to do so (school, job, sports) or 
when the circumstances are such that one has a goal that pushes 
one to go at one’s limits (e.g., when trying to catch a bus, one runs 
as fast as one can), but in our daily life maximum performance is 
the exception and not the rule; with respect to walking or running 
speed, mostly it is typical performance (“not too much and not 
too little”), and it depends on the situation (e.g., whether I am in 
a hurry or I have time, etc.).
maxImum performance and SItuatIon SpecIfIcIty
In terms of the TSS, situations in which maximum performance 
is asked for are such that the subject has only one goal: to perform 
at his or her best, i.e., to get at the limit of his or her ability; simi-
larly, Cronbach (1970) refers to such tests as “tests of ability.” Test 
conceivers and users are required to design and apply assessment 
tools in such a way that the subjects have no goals to perform lower 
than their ability level, and they have to provide a situation in which 
there are as little obstacles to this as possible.
The convergent, concurrent and predictive validities will be 
applicable if the conditions for maximum performance mentioned 
above are met for both tests (the test to be validated and the crite-
rion test). This is the case if
1.  the subject knows the required performance and the criterion 
to judge its quality;
2.  the criterion is such that the more of the behavior, the better;
3.  the goal of the subject is to perform as well as possible;
4.  the subject has no simultaneous incompatible goal (i.e., the 
goal of not doing his or her best) in this situation; and
5.  there is no other factor that inhibit the maximal effort.
The best example for this is intelligence which can be considered 
as the best predictor of school performance (e.g., Bratko et al., 
2006; Spinath et al., 2006; Freudenthaler et al., 2008); it seems that 
at least the first four conditions are satisfied: The subjects know 
what is expected from them, the relationship is “the more, the 
better,” the students try to perform at their best, and there are few 
incompatible goals if any. Whether the fifth condition applies in 
school might be questioned in some cases. For instance personality 
classical intelligence tests as assessed, for instance, with the Raven 
Progressive Matrices Test or the Culture Fair Intelligence Test (the 
authors’ prototypes of maximal performance). Nevertheless, all 
these tests satisfy the conditions for maximum performance in the 
sense of Cronbach (1970): The issue in his distinction is not whether 
the ability at stake is basic or applied, but whether the assessment 
is a test of ability or of actual behavior and the like.
As an example for the two types of assessment, imagine an 
intelligence test as prototype of maximum performance and a 
questionnaire for extraversion as prototype of typical perform-
ance; both assessment tools are used in two contexts (situations): 
(S1) a typical research situation with volunteers who know that 
the result will have no consequence on their life, and (S2) a typi-
cal job application situation for a position as salesman. In both 
situations the subject will try to perform optimally: In S1, since 
he or she is a volunteer, he or she will not be negativistic (in the 
sense of Weber and Cook, 1972) but try to impress the researcher 
(impression management, Christensen, 1981), while in S2 he or 
she wants to get the job. For the intelligence test, the subject 
will try, in both situations, to perform at his or her best. For 
the extraversion questionnaire, the constellation is different: In 
S1, the subject will answer as he or she thinks to be more or less 
appropriate, particularly depending on his or her self-concept 
according to his or her interpretation of the items (trying to fol-
low the instruction to be honest, cf. Table 2). In S2, however, he 
or she might identify the items as assessing introversion; since 
he or she thinks salesmen should be extraverted, he or she will 
tend to give the response assumed to represent extraversion. The 
presumptive employer (who, in this regard, has the same role 
in S2 as the researcher described in the table and in S1) is not 
interested whether the applicant will behave intelligently or in 
an extraverted way in all situations but what he or she will do 
in practical sales situations (S3): For intelligence as well as for 
extraversion, predictions for future behavior are intended. The 
prediction from S2 to S3 will be much more valid with respect to 
intelligence (maximum performance) than for extraversion given 
all the constraints of typical assessments. The comparison of the 
two columns concerning maximum and typical behavior reveals 
other differences related with TSS (which cannot be accounted 
for in detail here) which show that the validity of the former is 
much higher than the validity of the latter.
The question is whether the issues addressed in the table are rel-
evant in situations other than paper–pencil or face-to-face assess-
ments, such as observations in natural settings or unobtrusive 
measures (Webb et al., 2000). A prototypical example is school: 
School grades are some kind of unobtrusive measures because 
the tests they are based on are not done for research purposes. 
For instance, mathematics tests, if well done, satisfy most of the 
conditions for maximum behavior mentioned in Table 2, with the 
teacher taking the role of the researcher. Other school tests may 
fit these conditions to a lesser degree; particularly the criterion 
“Instruction: What is assessed” is not always met: In many tests 
the ability at stake (or the criterion for right answers) is not told 
to the students, and maybe several criteria are relevant simulta-
neously, such as spelling, grammar, style, structure, and content 
in an essay; as to the content of the essay, the student might not 
know (or guess) what is important to the teacher and what is Frontiers in Psychology  |  Quantitative Psychology and Measurement    February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 18  |  10
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It is striking that in social psychology deception (Milgram, 1963, 
is a classic example for this) with the risk of suspicion (McGuire, 
1969) has been used extremely often. According to Hertwig and 
Ortmann (2008, p. 65), 50% and more of the articles published in 
the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology and in the Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology employed deception. Other 
methods like projective tests (e.g., the Rorschach test), unobtrusive 
assessments (Webb et al., 2000), subtle (instead of obvious) items 
(Lanyon, 1984)5, naturalistic observation situations (e.g., “wait-
ing situation,” Mehrabian, 1971) have been used; since many of 
them are ethically questionable, there must be strong reasons not 
to avoid them.
The aim is to reduce some of the many potential biases (Sackett, 
1979, cataloged “35 biases that arise in sampling and measure-
ment,” p. 51) that are linked with features like social desirability 
(Edwards, 1957), reactance (Brehm, 1966), demand characteristics 
(Orne, 1969), subjects’ motives (Weber and Cook, 1972), experi-
menter effects (Rosenthal, 1976), faking (Pauls and Crost, 2005), 
etc. This can be seen as a means to eliminate potentially disturbing 
factors (see the second reaction according to Bungard and Bay, 
1982, presented in the introduction), the disturbing factor being 
the subjects’ knowledge about relevant issues. One cannot imagine, 
for instance, that Milgram could have done his studies with the 
subjects knowing that the real theme of the study was not learning 
but obedience. Interestingly, Geller (1978) found that involvement, 
i.e., being absorbed by the situation, forgetting everything else, etc. 
(this is comparable with flow in the sense of Csikszentmihalyi and 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1988) yielded similar results as Milgram even 
when the subjects knew the aim of the study beforehand – but 
they had forgotten it; according to the TSS, the subjective theory 
(the goal structure) is only relevant insofar as it is activated in the 
particular situation, and involvement in the sense of Geller leads the 
subject to take into account the goals and means he or she would 
do spontaneously (without influence by the researcher).
The conditions for convergent or criterion validities in social 
research situations according to the TSS are much more complex 
than for maximum performance. Given that people tend to behave 
optimally as assumed in the TSS, the following issues must be taken 
into regard:
1.  What are the goals in the respective situations? Are the goals 
similar, or are they different?
2.  What are the means that are appropriate to achieve the goals 
according to the subject?
Let us look at the goals first. In social situations, according to 
the TSS, one can assume polytely (multiple goals) with conflicts on 
the goal and on the means levels and – typically – compromises. 
One can further assume that the respective goals depend on the 
situation, which is determined by how the subject perceives it, par-
ticularly by the features seen as important. And the most important 
variable can increase the variance accounted for: conscientious-
ness (Bratko et al., 2006), self-esteem (Freudenthaler et al., 2008), 
and ability self-perceptions and intrinsic values (Spinath et al., 
2006), etc.
The impact of the respective variables is consistent with the 
five conditions:
•	 Conscientiousness	 is	 “a	 trait	 referring	 to	 individuals’	 level	
of  dutifulness,  achievement  striving,  and  organization. 
Importance  of  Conscientiousness  in  educational  settings  is 
self-explanatory: Being organized, disciplined, and motivated 
to succeed has no doubt beneficial effects on students’ study 
habits, affecting their level of effort and commitment with the 
course.” (Bratko et al., 2006, p. 132) Conscientiousness, hence, 
is linked with conditions 3 (perform as well as possible) and 
4 (it means that the goal of performing as well as possible is 
the students’ dominant purpose). Lack of conscientiousness 
would therefore be an inhibiting factor.
•	 Self-esteem,	ability	self-perception,	and	intrinsic	values	relate	
with the confidence to perform well and hence with the effort 
put into performing well; inversely, low self-esteem, low ability 
self-perception, and low intrinsic values can be seen as inhibi-
ting factors (see condition 5).
Other variables accounting for school performance, like school-
related  intrinsic  motivation,  school  anxiety,  and  performance-
avoidance goals (only for boys) and work avoidance (only for 
girls; Freudenthaler et al., 2008) or differential influences of the 
variables in different content areas (Spinath et al., 2006) confirm 
the importance of the five conditions but show also that they are 
just a framework; for each of them specifications are necessary with 
relation to the specific conditions.
In many laboratory research designs, for instance in cognitive 
psychology, maximum performance tools are used for the assess-
ment of competence. A classic example is Ebbinghaus’ (1913) use 
of nonsense syllables: The syllables were learned according to a 
specific paradigm until they could be fully reproduced. The five 
conditions are satisfied: The more syllables the subject can repro-
duce, the better the performance; if all syllables can be reproduced, 
the ability (in this case, knowledge) is at its peak. Ebbinghaus tested 
what strategy would lead the learner the quickest to this perform-
ance. The advantage of this procedure, with respect to the issues 
discussed here, is that this way the assessments can be performed 
with high reliability and, if done appropriately, with high validity. 
Similar approaches have been used in most studies on memory 
and for other cognitive tasks with great success. In my view this 
is one of the most important reasons for the rapid progress in 
cognitive psychology.
typIcal performance and SItuatIon SpecIfIcIty
In contrast to cognitive psychology, the success in social and per-
sonality psychology has been much slower. In the 1970s and 1980s 
there was even a talk about social psychology’s crisis (e.g., Elms, 
1975). I pretend that the problems with assessment are the most 
important source of difficulties and that this is due to the “not too 
much and not too little” -relationship (or typical performance) 
discussed above.
5 Lanyon (1984, p. 674): “The question of the validity of subtle vs. obvious items 
continues to be debated. The notion that subtle items make a small but unique 
contribution to valid variance (…) has been eroded by the literature.”, and he cites 
several studies that “showed that scales using subtle items were less valid than those 
composed of obvious items” (Lanyon, 1984).www.frontiersin.org  February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 18  |  11
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report that some studies suggest that mothers try to maximize 
positive behavior, while other studies did not replicate this finding. 
In their own study, “results indicated relatively few instances of 
reactivity effects (…). The larger literature on reactivity effects in 
family research (…) yields the same general conclusion.” (p. 360) 
In this context it is not so important whether reactivity effects 
occur or not; the relevant issue is that it is possible that they occur, 
and if no theory is available to predict such effects, researchers 
must always live with the risk of reactivity.
TSS can account for these biases as follows:
•	 If	the	subjects	know	that	they	are	being	observed	for	rese-
arch  purposes,  they  will  have  the  goal  of  self-presentation 
(Christensen, 1981).
•	 Given	 polytely,	 the	 subjects	 have	 other	 goals	 besides	 self-
presentation.
•	 If	a	situation	has	been	set	up	purely	for	research	reasons	(typi-
cally laboratory research), i.e., if the decisions made in the 
situation by the subjects have no impact on the subjects’ fur-
ther life or on other people involved (except for the resear-
chers) one can assume that the subjects have few other goals if 
any. But even in this case the specific form of self-presentation 
will depend on a multitude of factors that cannot be discus-
sed here. This can be a question of goals and/or a question of 
means.
•	 If	the	outcomes	of	the	subject’s	behavior	are	of	any	future	
importance  outside  of  the  research  context,  corresponding 
goals will become important. For instance, a teacher in the 
classroom may be aware of observers and may try to please 
them, but at the same time he or she will have the practical 
goals which include conveying the content as intended, kee-
ping discipline, engaging the students in learning, etc. (e.g., 
Hofer, 1984; Krampen, 1984), hence he or she cannot concen-
trate uniquely on impression management on the observer.
•	 In	 both	 cases,	 the	 goals	 and/or	 the	 corresponding	 means	
will  probably  be  incompatible  to  some  degree  (goals  and 
means conflicts).
An adaptation of this concept has been presented by Patry (2004). 
It is not possible here to go into further details. It must be mentioned, 
though, that the factors playing a role in typical performance are 
much too complex to permit at the current state of the art to predict 
with reasonable precision what biases will have an influence – one 
can just say that the likelihood of biases is very high. The framework 
presented above provides at least a series of relevant factor groups 
and a first approach for theory. It will be important to apply this 
framework to different studies to develop it further.
concluSIonS
The distinction between typical and maximum behavior is closely 
linked to the distinction between “not too much and not too lit-
tle” and “the more, the better” in the TSS. The impact on research 
is considerable. The research results are in agreement with these 
theoretical assumptions. For instance Follman (1984) reports the 
data presented in Table 3. As can be seen, maximum performance 
assessments in both situations (here: assessment instruments) yield 
high correlations, provided the ability at stake is the same in both 
features in order to behave optimally are those that determine the 
goals the subject wants to pursue. Hence the first question is how 
the goals are influenced in the research situation.
The theoretical accounts of biases presented above unanimously 
emphasize goals related with the awareness of the fact that one is 
being observed. This is obviously the case for social desirability 
(Edwards, 1957), the aim being to present oneself in a positive 
way, and with the subjects’ motives according to Weber and Cook 
(1972) and faking. Reactance (Brehm, 1966) is a special case: The 
subject perceives restrictions imposed upon him or her through 
the research situation (specific interpretation of the situation) 
and aims at re-establishing the freedom. One can further assume 
that the experimenter effect (Rosenthal, 1976) is closely related to 
goals because the subject wants to respond positively to the per-
ceived demands of the respective situations, and the same applies 
to demand characteristics (Orne, 1969). Even the use of naturalistic 
observation situations is related with the subjects’ goals, as has 
been shown, for instance, by Higgins et al. (1983): The aims of the 
subjects are different depending on whether they know that they 
are being observed or not.
In most examples from Webb et al. (2000) the advantage of 
unobtrusive methods is that the subjects’ goals are not influenced 
by the fact that a research is taking place. Subtle items have the 
function to hide the real goal of the research situation so that the 
subjects’ goals to behave according to the perceived requirements 
of the situation do not interfere with the issues addressed in the 
hypothesis, and deception has the same justification. Reactivity of 
behavioral observations (e.g., Christensen and Hazzard, 1983) can 
also be accounted for through goal shifts.
Overall, most of the biases are due – at least partly – to addi-
tional goals because the subjects know that they are observed for 
research purposes as opposed to natural or naturalistic situations 
in which the subjects are unaware of the observation. According 
to Christensen (1981), the main goal is self-presentation; while 
Christensen focuses on the motives discussed by Weber and Cook 
(1972), the argumentation above suggests that this kind of goals 
may be as important in most other sources for biases as well.
However, the effects are not always the same, as can be seen 
when the same bias is analyzed repeatedly. The effect sizes of 
the impacts of knowing about being observed often cannot be 
replicated, and small changes in the research conditions may 
completely alter the size of the bias or even eliminate it at all. 
With respect to reactivity effects, for instance, Jacob et al. (1994) 
state that various reviews of the literature on the observation 
of distressed and non-distressed families “have concluded that 
findings have been diverse and inconclusive” (p. 355), and they 
attribute this status “to the scarcity of methodologically sound 
studies on this topic” and “to the fact that many variables can 
affect the strength and direction of reactivity. Furthermore, the 
theoretical frameworks relevant to explaining reactivity effects 
(…) have been extremely limited.” (Jacob et al., 1994) While the 
first reason (few methodologically sound studies) may be true, 
the second and third reasons – which are related since it would be 
necessary to integrate the variables in a theoretical framework – 
seem far more important; however, although the authors call for 
a theory, they do not provide one except for saying that the most 
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Secondly, it is important to replace the traditional “theory test-
ing approach” by a more modest ambition. The best we can do is 
what Dewey (quoted from Phillips and Burbules, 2000, p. 31) has 
called “warranted assertibility”:
When knowledge is taken as a general abstract term related to 
inquiry in the abstract, it means “warranted assertibility.” The use 
of a term that designates a potentiality rather than an actuality 
involves recognition that all special conclusions of special inquir-
ies are parts of an enterprise that is continually renewed, or is a 
going concern.
A warranty, in this context, is a support of a statement or its 
credibility (Phillips, 1997). Every statement that is claimed to be 
scientific needs to be backed up in a reasonable way. The more argu-
ments in favor of a statement are provided, and the more substantial 
they are, the more credible the statement is (see also Phillips and 
Burbules, 2000, p. 3).
theoretIcal ISSueS
Biases are usually interpreted as error, as distortion of the data, as 
something that is unwelcome and must be avoided. However, these 
biases may be “as much part of the ‘true’ fabric of human behavior, 
to be understood and analyzed,”6 as the behavior that is addressed 
in the theory and in the hypotheses. Why should the biases not be 
some kind of truth, why should it be completely different from 
everything else? Instead it is much more appropriate to assume that 
there is not a contradiction between the behavior one is interested 
in and the behavior associated with biases.
For this it is necessary to combine the theories used – the theory 
under investigation (“research theory”) and the theory that accounts 
for the biases. Whether the TSS is an appropriate framework for this 
endeavor will depend on the research question and on the research 
theory. Not all research theories are fully compatible with the TSS. 
The claim here is not that the TSS is the only approach that accounts 
for biases; instead it is a proposition, but if it is not compatible with 
the research theory other theories of bias must be used.
How can this integration of theories be performed? An exam-
ple is research in education. By definition and in practice, edu-
cation means to pursue many goals simultaneously (polytely); 
many of these goals are incompatible: Teachers have educational 
goals like the students’ mastery and performance (e.g., Wolters 
and Daugherty, 2007; Darnon et al., 2010), fostering the students’ 
social competence and emotional development and other social 
goals (Allody, 2010), keeping discipline (Reyna and Weiner, 2001) 
etc., but they have also personal goals like emotional regulation 
(Sutton, 2004) etc. Publications on didactics usually underline the 
antagonist structure of teaching; Becker (1984), for instance, lists 
more than 20 tradeoff pairs, such as “foster interaction between 
students – and support individual work” or “respond to students’ 
questions – and leave some questions unanswered.”
When observing teaching overtly for research purposes, it is nec-
essary according to the TSS (i) to take into account all presumptive 
goals of the teachers have typically (or, if available, all goals they 
actually have) in such teaching situations, (ii) to check whether 
assessments (this is not the case, for instance, when correlating IQ 
with creativity, last row in the table). Whenever at least one of the 
variables is typical performance, the variance accounted for (square 
of the correlation) is about 10%.
Studies comparing typical and maximum performance con-
firm the hypotheses that emanate from the theory as described; 
for instance, most studies reported in the articles of the special 
issue of Human Performance (Klehe et al., 2007) dealing with job 
performance are in agreement with the theory (Klehe et al., 2007; 
Mangos et al., 2007; Marcus et al., 2007; Ones and Viswesvaran, 
2007), others provide results that go beyond the theory and may 
give hints as to how to improve it (Smith-Jentsch, 2007). In any 
case the concept proved to be quite promising.
dIScuSSIon
Issues of situation specificity have been neglected in psychology in 
general and in methodological discussions in particular. However, 
such issues are addressed frequently with respect to methodical 
problems and in practical contexts, yet without being analyzed 
systematically: Often it is just said that a specific phenomenon 
must be regarded as situation specific, but there is no theoretical 
account. Actually, whenever methodical or methodological prob-
lems are addressed in a publication – particularly when social 
behavior is at stake –, it is likely that situation specificity is relevant 
in some way.
meta-theoretIcal ISSueS
Given the complexity of the theoretical framework that should take 
into account all the issues mentioned above – situations, multiple 
theories, and many more – it becomes impossible to conceive stud-
ies that address it as a whole. Rather, it is necessary to follow several 
research strategies.
First of all, research programs (see, for instance, Herrmann, 
1976) instead of single studies are appropriate; each study within 
this program contributes a piece to the full picture. We have fol-
lowed such a program for situation specificity for the last 30 years 
(Patry, 2005b).
Table 3 | Real-world correlations (excerpt from Follman, 1984, p. 702; the 
references are omitted).
Variables  r
IQ test reliability  0.90s
Standardized school achievement test reliabilities  0.90s
IQ and school achievement–grade 1  0.85-0.90
IQ and school achievement–college from high school  0.50-0.55
GRE and graduate school grade point average  0.00-0.40
IQ and memory (higher with age into adulthood)  0.50-0.70
The uBiquiTous 0.35 CoRRelATioN
School achievement (cognitive) and affective  0.35
School achievement and self-concept  0.35
School achievement and motivation  0.35
School achievement and student ratings of  0.44 
teacher effectiveness
IQ and self-concept  0.35
IQ and creativity  0.35
6 This is a quote from Mischel and Peake (1983, p. 395; cf. above, The Problem) but 
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sense of Bungard and Bay, 1982); however, the validity of such a 
statement is highly questionable. Including the situational depend-
ency of the goals (and hence of the means to achieve them) in the 
theoretical framework may at least address the question of gener-
alizability; it might well be that it can then lead to more precise 
predictions. But until this can be done, much more research will be 
necessary. Nevertheless, this incertitude is still much more valuable 
than falsely pretending that there is no problem at all.
methodologIcal ISSueS
Warranted  assertibility  (see  Meta-theoretical  Issues)  can  be 
improved by following the principles of critical multiplism (Cook, 
1985; Patry, 1989b; Shadish et al., 2002). Hetherington (1997) dis-
tinguished two dimensions of research: thoughtless vs. thought-
ful research and single vs. multiple methods; critical multiplism 
refers to thoughtful multiplism, which means systematic, rational 
theory-driven multiplism with the researcher being well aware of 
the problems and biases. The attempt is to compensate the biases a 
given method has or may have by using a different method that has 
different biases. This permits, if not to correct for biases, to iden-
tify whether such biases are present. Campbell and Fiske’s (1959) 
multitrait–multimethod matrix that was discussed above is a pro-
totype of such an approach (for details, see Patry, 2008).
practIcal conSequenceS
Practitioners (e.g., teachers, social workers, parents) have always 
known that social behavior is situation specific; in particular they 
have deliberately treated different children differently. For social 
scientists, it is different: Although research has shown very early 
that social behavior is situation specific (the first studies addressing 
hypotheses of situation specificity date from the late 1920s, e.g., 
Newcomb, 1929) they have neglected it. Only within personality 
psychology a debate about cross-situational consistency has erupted 
after Mischel’s “Personality and assessment” (1968), but the focus 
of this debate was on retaining or abolishing the concept of per-
sonality. This question falls short of the importance of situation 
specificity in social research, as I have tried to show in this paper: 
Situation specificity and its impact on biases cannot be argued 
away but must be recognized; denying this would be following 
the first strategy Bungard and Bay (1982) mentioned: acting as if 
there were no biases.
One can guess why the topic of situation specificity has been so 
much neglected. There are several plausible reasons:
•	 When	 attributing	 reasons	 for	 the	 behavior	 of	 other  people 
humans tend to use dispositional theories, i.e., theories that 
do not take into consideration situations; when attributing 
one’s own behavior, however, people tend to refer to concepts 
like goals and means to achieve them in situations (Jones and 
Nisbett, 1971). It might well be that social scientists focus on 
other people and not on themselves. Some researchers under-
lined the role of their intuition, most drastically Bem and Allen 
(1974) with the following statement:
We are not here denying the well-documented biases and illusions 
which plague our intuitions, nor do we claim that the more formal-
ized idiographic procedures used by clinicians have a better track 
and how far these goals are being influenced by the presence of an 
external observer, (iii) to ask whether the presence of the observer 
triggers new goals, and (iv) to estimate the balance, i.e., the relative 
weights of the different goals in this situation. Depending on the 
situation, the teacher’s goal balances will be different:
S1  The teacher is alone with his or her students; this is the regular 
teaching situation. Variations in the teacher’s goals are likely: 
The balances in the sense of Becker may differ from situation 
to situation.
S2  A researcher has asked the teacher to implement a new tea-
ching method and is recording the teaching by video. The 
teacher will probably aim at implementing the new teaching 
method to the best of his or her knowledge at the expense of 
other goals; if he or she does not agree with the new method, 
he or she will sabotage it (negativistic subject in the sense of 
Weber and Cook, 1972).
S3  The parent of a student sits in the back of the classroom. The 
focus of the attention on this specific student will probably 
have a high priority within the teacher’s objectives.
S4  The principal of the school observes the teacher. The teacher is 
likely to aim at showing that he or she is a good teacher accor-
ding to the principal’s values (which may be different from the 
teacher’s).
S5  In the case of an internship, the supervisor judges the student 
teacher’s actions. The student teacher’s most important goal 
will probably be to comply with the preferences of the super-
visor (Arnold et al., 2011).
In all these cases the teacher’s goals and behavior are likely to 
be different from the ones in S1. It might well be that during the 
course of teaching, the teacher forgets the fact that he or she is 
being observed (e.g., flow or habituation) – then the impact of the 
presence of the observer in any of the situation will be reduced, 
and the behavior resembles more the one in S1.
Each of the goals is linked with a theory that describes how 
to achieve the goal (and which then is subordinate to the theory 
of situation specificity as discussed in The Theory of Situation 
Specificity): To account for the teacher’s teaching of subject matters 
(S1), a didactical theory may be appropriate (e.g., “this is construc-
tivist teaching”), while for the other situations, a theory of self-pres-
entation might be used (for S2, for instance, see Christensen, 1981) 
which in turn refer to still other theories (e.g., in the case of S5, to the 
supervisor’s favorite didactical theory). It might also be necessary 
to distinguish scientific theories that can describe and explain the 
teacher’s behavior (e.g., an expected utility model, Feather, 1988) 
and the teacher’s subjective theories (theories dealing with ques-
tions like “How can I reach the goals that I want to achieve?” and 
“How can I balance the different goals?” Patry, 2005a).
This example also illustrates another consequence of applying 
the TSS to research situations. The question is whether it is possible 
to make predictions about the behavior of the teacher’s in S1 based 
on an observation in one of the situations S2 through S5. This is 
the question of generalizability of the findings, or in other words 
of the domain of validity of the scientific statement that emanates 
from the research (Patry, 1991b). One can attempt to make such 
predictions without taking into account the TSS (reaction 1 in the Frontiers in Psychology  |  Quantitative Psychology and Measurement    February 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 18  |  14
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